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Law, Authority & History: A Tribute to Douglas Hay
Pardon and Parole in Prohibition-Era 
New York: Discretionary Justice in the 
Administrative State*
CAROLYN STRANGE†
Historians of early-modern England and British colonies have productively applied Douglas 
Hay’s germinal study of mercy. In contrast, historians of the United States have overlooked the 
utility of the conceptual tools Hay provided to prize open the mitigation of punishment across 
time and place. In the decade that followed the First World War, disputes over the proper role 
of mercy and administrative discretion were as heated as they were in Hanoverian England. 
In Jazz Age New York, fears of gangsterism and concern over the apparent laxity of parole 
regulations put the proponents of Progressive penology on the defensive. This article asks 
what drove opinion against discretionary justice in the form of the pardon and parole, and 
traces the conditions that gave rise to judgments that discretionary justice was too frequent 
and injudicious. A new vision of order, fixated on penal certainty, came into sharp focus 
over the 1920s, when mandatory sentencing statutes were introduced. Yet gubernatorial 
clemency survived that crisis, and in 1930 parole was professionalized and placed under 
stricter management. This article confirms that modernity proved no match for discretionary 
justice. In its personal and administrative forms, discretion penetrates penal justice, despite 
the earnest drive to certainty and the persistent demands to terrorize criminals.
Les historiens de l’Angleterre et des colonies britanniques de l’époque moderne ont utilisé 
à l’envi l’étude préliminaire de Douglas Hay sur la clémence. En revanche, les historiens 
spécialistes des États-Unis ont négligé l’utilité des outils conceptuels proposés par M. Hay 
* An earlier version of this article was presented at the Law/Authority/History: A Tribute to 
Douglas Hay symposium to mark the retirement of Douglas Hay. The symposium took 
place on 5 and 6 May 2016 at Osgoode Hall Law School and the York University History 
Department, Toronto.
† Carolyn Strange is a scholar, based at the Australian National University, who focuses on the 
analysis of criminal justice and gender in US, Canadian, and Australian modern history. Her 
latest book is Discretionary Justice: Pardon and Parole in New York, from the Revolution to the 
Depression (New York: New York University Press, 2016).
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pour envisager l’allègement des sanctions en termes de durée et de lieu. Au cours de la 
décennie qui a suivi la Première Guerre mondiale, les débats sur le rôle de la clémence et de 
la discrétion administrative ont ainsi engendré des querelles aussi vives que dans l’Angleterre 
des Hanovre. À New York à l’ère du jazz, les craintes à l’égard du gangstérisme et l’inquiétude 
envers le laxisme apparent des règles en matière de libération conditionnelle ont mis les 
partisans de la pénologie progressiste sur la défensive. Cet article examine les facteurs 
qui ont mobilisé l’opinion contre la justice discrétionnaire, matérialisée sous la forme de la 
grâce et de la libération conditionnelle. Il retrace également les conditions dans lesquelles 
les tribunaux ont rendu des décisions jugeant la justice discrétionnaire trop fréquente et 
injuste. En effet, une nouvelle vision de l’ordre, axée sur la certitude pénale, est clairement 
apparue dans les années 1920, lorsque des lois sur les peines obligatoires ont été adoptées. 
Néanmoins, la clémence du gouvernement a survécu à cette crise et, en 1930, la libération 
conditionnelle a été confiée à des professionnels et assortie d’une gestion plus stricte. Cet 
article confirme que la modernité n’a eu aucune influence sur la justice discrétionnaire. 
Dans ses formes personnelles et administratives, la discrétion imprègne la justice pénale, en 
dépit d’un fort désir de certitude et des demandes persistantes pour terroriser les criminels. 
THE POWER TO PARDON, an enduring aspect of criminal justice with ancient 
and divine roots, resurfaced as a political issue in the late twentieth century, 
as mandatory sentencing laws consigned hundreds of thousands of petty 
criminals along with serious violent offenders to long-term incarceration in many 
advanced democracies.1 In the United States, some social justice advocates have 
questioned the prospect of pardoning as a potential remedy, citing its tendency 
to favour the white and wealthy, but assertive voices have begun to urge the 
1. A key work on this phenomenon remains David Garland’s book. See David Garland, 
The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2001).
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more vigorous use of discretionary clemency to alleviate the pains of mandatory 
imprisonment.2 This debate rests on narrow ground, however. Until recently, 
scholars have concentrated on presidential pardoning, despite the fact that most 
offenders are convicted under state criminal laws.3 When Illinois Governor 
George Ryan decided in 2003 to pardon four men on death row and to commute 
the life sentences of 167 prisoners he exposed state executives’ power to mitigate 
the punishment for most criminal offences. Ryan’s dramatic demonstration 
of discretionary justice has inspired socio-legal scholarship that productively 
questions mercy’s relationship with the terror of capital punishment and the 
slow death of life without parole.4 The significance of discretionary justice in 
contemporary US penal politics could not be clearer, and the need to rectify 
the dearth of historical research on the subject in US state history could not 
be more pressing.
This article takes up that challenge by applying Douglas Hay’s germinal 
study of mercy—the neglected “other face” of criminal justice—to debates over 
discretionary justice in Prohibition-era New York.5 Despite claims that colonial 
contexts provide the most fruitful sites to test Hay’s analysis, the broader insights 
in his essay are well-suited to prize open the mitigation of punishment in any 
jurisdiction or period.6 Mercy, Hay argued, operates not according to law or 
rules but in response to politics, “mental and social structures,” and the ever 
2. On the prejudicial patterns of presidential pardoning, see Robin Respaut, Al Shaw & Krista 
Kjellman Schmidt, “Timeline: A History of Pardons” (December 2011), online: <www.
propublica.org/special/timeline-a-history-of-pardons>. On pardon advocacy to rectify 
injustice, see Margaret Colgate Love, “Reinventing the President’s Pardon Power” (2007) 
20:5 Fed Sent R 5; Margaret Colgate Love, “Fear of Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the 
Practice of Pardoning” (2000-2001) 13:3-4 Fed Sent R 125.
3. Jeremy Crouch, “The Law: The Presidential Misuse of the Pardon Power” (2008) 38:4 
Pres Stud Q 722; PS Ruckman Jr, “Executive Clemency in the United States: Origins, 
Development, and Analysis (1900–1993)” (1997) 27:2 Pres Stud Q 251; Kathleen 
Dean Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989).
4. Austin Sarat, Mercy on Trial: What it Means to Stop an Execution (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005); Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, eds, Forgiveness, Mercy and Clemency 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
5. Douglas Hay, “Foreward” in Carolyn Strange, ed, Qualities of Mercy: Justice, Punishment and 
Discretion (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1996) vii at viii-ix.
6. Jim Phillips, “Albion’s Empire: Property, Authority and the Criminal Law in 
Eighteenth-Century Canada” (2006) 10 LH 21 at 26.
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shifting “problem of public order.”7 With this checklist of criteria to interrogate, 
and mindful, as he was, of discretionary justice’s contingency, the historian of 
mercy can range beyond the well-charted histories of England and its former 
colonies.8 Bridging from that rich historiography, mercy’s politics can be charted 
to capture its contours and its sometimes seismic shifts. The questions Hay first 
formulated to analyze Hanoverian England are timeless: What drives opinion in 
favour of mercy or against its use? When is clemency judged to be too frequent 
or indiscreet? How and why do the “mental worlds” that give mercy its meanings 
change hue? If, as Hay stressed, the history of discretionary justice is made by 
individuals, not dictated by systems or ideologies, why do certain individuals’ 
voices accrue authority?
In post-World War I New York the fear of gun-related violence created a 
volatile setting for debate over administrative and executive discretionary justice. 
Whereas industrialization and urbanization stoked similar concerns in mid 
eighteenth-century England, Prohibition-related gangsterism, and the apparent 
ease with which bandits preyed on the public with little risk of punishment, 
produced a political environment hostile to any hint of mercy, whether in the 
form of the governor’s pardon or the parole board’s grants of release. Property 
and authority seemed under attack, and a modern version of the gentry—
captains of industry—banded with Republican politicians to wage war against 
crime. The proponents of Progressive penology, whose authority rose over the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, lost credibility after Prohibition 
came into force in 1919. Over the next decade a new vision of justice, fixated 
with penal certainty, came into sharp focus. By the late 1920s, when mandatory 
sentencing statutes were introduced, executive clemency was constrained by 
governors’ worries over appearing soft on crime, not by legislative or constitutional 
change. Yet gubernatorial clemency survived that crisis, and in 1930 parole was 
professionalized and placed under stricter management. Modern administrative 
discretion and the pardon came to coexist in one of the most forward-looking 
penal jurisdictions in the world.
7. Douglas Hay, “Property, Authority and the Criminal Law” in Douglas Hay et al, eds, Albion’s 
Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Allen Lane, 1975) 
17 at 24, 26, 53 [Hay, “Property”].
8. For key works, see Jim Phillips, “The Operation of the Royal Pardon in Nova Scotia, 
1749-1815” (1992) 42:4 UTLJ 401; Peter King, Crime, Justice and Discretion in England, 
1740-1820 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Simon Devereaux, “Peel, Pardon, and 
Punishment” in Devereaux & Paul Griffiths, eds, Penal Practice and Culture, 1500-1900: 
Punishing the English (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 258.
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I. RATIONALIZING REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
The framers and subsequent defenders of the US Constitution needed no 
convincing that the pardon was a matter for careful consideration. Alexander 
Hamilton deployed his political persuasiveness and rhetorical flare in the 1780s 
to ensure that the Chief Executive was assigned constitutional authority to grant 
pardons unfettered by any check or balance from the judicial or legislative branch 
of government. Although a revolutionary leader, Hamilton took his cue from 
Locke and Blackstone, not radicals such as Thomas Paine who warned that any 
hint of monarchical fiat would lead to tyranny.9 Hot-headed republicans might 
wish to strike out executive discretion (indeed, Pennsylvania’s first Constitution 
substituted an elected council),10 but Hamilton argued successfully that the 
nation’s leader must have the option to win over enemies in volatile times. 
In the rebel states no less than the old empire, justice must bear a benevolent 
countenance to curry loyalty.
Today’s advocates of a more robust exercise of clemency typically refer to 
the framers and founders of the federal justice system to justify their pleas.11 
The historiographical preoccupation with the presidency and the passage of the 
Constitution has ensured that the origins of executive pardoning at the federal 
level have been studied intensively.12 Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story saw 
nothing unfitting in the Republic’s incorporation of a power long associated 
with the royal prerogative and the divine right of kings. In 1833 he wrote that 
the “power of pardon” was not “incompatible with the fundamental principles 
of a republic.” On the contrary: “it may be boldly asserted to be peculiarly 
appropriate, and safe in all free states; because the power can there be guarded by 
9. Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Penguin, 2004) at 253-59.
10. John Dinan, “The Pardon Power and the American State Constitution Tradition” (2003) 
35:3 Polity 389 at 396.
11. Paul Rosenzweig, “A Federalist Conception of the Pardon Power” (4 December 2012) 89 
Legal Memorandum 1 (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation).
12. For the first substantial study, see Willard H Humbert, The Pardoning Power of the President 
(Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941). For a review of this work and 
subsequent scholarship, see PS Ruckman Jr, “The Study of Mercy: What Political Scientists 
Know (and Don’t Know) about the Pardon Power” (2012) 9:3 U St Thomas LJ 783.
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a just responsibility for its exercise.”13 References to such high-minded statements 
and to pardoning’s constitutional validity may have buoyed recent efforts to 
reinvigorate executive clemency, but they tell us nothing about the ways that 
discretionary justice operated once it was put into practice. With few exceptions, 
historians have also failed to examine the impact of parole in its various guises, 
treating it separately from pardoning. Finally, the need for grounded studies of 
mercy’s past, as it transformed in conjunction and tension with parole, is most 
pressing at the level of states.
II. A CASE FOR STATE-BASED STUDIES OF DISCRETIONARY 
JUSTICE
Leading socio-legal scholars, notably Austin Sarat, David Garland, and Jonathan 
Simon, have drawn on Hay’s work since the 1980s to explore the historical roots 
of contemporary penal politics, but just two historians of the United States have 
followed suit.14 Vivien M.L. Miller’s and Ethan Blue’s histories of discretionary 
justice in Florida, California, and Texas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries have confirmed the enduring importance of patronage.15 In these states 
white elites exerted influence that determined which prisoners were reprieved 
from execution or spared from serving their full prison sentences, either by 
pardon boards or by governors in consultation with administrative appointees. 
Stark inequalities of class, race, and gender were reinforced through the exercise 
of mercy, since petitioners could urge and sponsor clemency, in many cases 
on condition that released prisoners work for employers under exploitative 
13. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States; with a Preliminary Review 
of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States before the Adoption of the Constitution 
(Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and Company, 1833) vol 3 at para 1491.
14. See e.g. Sarat, supra note 4; David Garland, “Sociological Perspectives on Punishment” 
(1991) 14 Crime Just 115; Jonathan Simon, Poor Discipline: Parole and the Social Control 
of the Underclass, 1890-1990 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). Garland later 
included an essay by Douglas Hay (“Hanging and the English Judges: The Judicial Politics of 
Retention and Abolition”) in his collection, co-edited with Randal McGowan and Michael 
Meranze, America’s Death Penalty: Between Past and Present (New York: New York University 
Press, 2011) 129.
15. Vivien ML Miller, Crime, Sexual Violence, and Clemency: Florida’s Pardon Board and Penal 
System in the Progressive Era (Gainsville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2000); Ethan Blue, 
Doing Time in the Depression: Everyday Life in Texas and California Prisons (New York: 
New York University Press, 2012). My own work continues in their footsteps. See Carolyn 
Strange, Discretionary Justice: Pardon and Parole in New York from the Revolution to the 
Depression (New York: New York University Press, 2016).
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conditions that underlined recipients’ subservience. Hanoverian England was 
distant in time and space from Progressive Era Florida or Texas and California 
during the Depression, yet the economic and social dynamics Hay identified 
played out in line with similar asymmetries through discretionary justice.16
The US Constitution delegated to the states the responsibility to determine 
criminal law as well as the conditions under which penalties might be mitigated. 
Since many states maintained gubernatorial authority over mercy’s dispensation 
well after parole became the dominant mode of discretionary release for prisoners, 
Hay’s analysis of terror, mercy, and majesty need not be considered a foreign 
historiographical import. Of all the states, New York was arguably the most 
majestic in its retention of the governor’s power to pardon, and according to one 
constitutional scholar, its founding set a precedent for a strong federal executive.17 
After the state’s First Constitution of 1777, which granted the legislature the 
power to pardon in cases of treason and murder, the Constitution of 1821 boosted 
executive authority, giving governors sole authority to pardon or commute death 
sentences for murder. Despite the ratification of three subsequent Constitutions, 
the governor of the State of New York retains to this day full latitude to grant 
pardons and commute sentences.18 Thus, when New York’s parole board assumed 
responsibility in 1930 for screening and appraising clemency requests in all but 
capital cases, this transformation of discretionary justice was administrative, not 
constitutional in nature.
Why did the governor’s pardoning prerogative persist despite mounting 
hostility toward discretionary justice in the 1920s? The answer lies, surprisingly, 
in the assault on discretionary justice, which advanced over the decade and 
culminated in the passage in 1926 of the first suite of mandatory imprisonment 
16. For an equally significant article which also draws on Hay’s essay, see Stephen Garton, 
“Managing Mercy: African Americans, Parole and Paternalism in the Georgia Prison System, 
1919-1945” (2003) 36:3 J Soc Hist 675.
17. Daniel J Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of 
Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664-1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005) at 175-76.
18. The State of New York adopted a third Constitution in 1846, a fourth in 1894 and a fifth 
in 1938, which has been amended several times. For the current Constitution (effective 1 
July 2014), see New York Department of State, “New York State Constitution” (1 January 
2014), online: <www.dos.ny.gov/info/constitution.htm>. For the authoritative history of the 
New York Constitution, see Charles Z Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York From 
the Beginning of the Colonial Period to 1905, Showing the Origin, Development, and Judicial 
Construction of the Constitution, 5 vols (Rochester: The Lawyers Co-Operative, 1906).
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statutes in the United States, commonly known as the Baumes laws.19 Named after 
Caleb H. Baumes, the powerful Republican senator who proudly bore the face 
of law and order, these laws included a statute that imposed life sentences on all 
felony offenders after a third felony conviction. Baumes battled alongside business 
leaders and newspaper editors who attacked discretionary justice in all its forms, 
including gubernatorial clemency. Yet parole was their enemy number one, since 
it appeared to permit bureaucrats to work behind closed doors for the criminal’s 
benefit, not the security of the law-abiding public. Defenders of mandatory life 
sentences contended that criminals less deserving of severe punishment could still 
petition the governor for mercy. Ironically, the most conservative opponents of 
administrative discretion defended executive prerogative power.
III. THE CRIME WAVE AND THE POLITICS OF DISCRETION
The short duration of US participation in the First World War did not shield it 
from a post-war crime wave, or at least the general impression that lawlessness 
was rife. Crime, especially gun-related violence, followed with the return of 
servicemen, a pattern historians have tracked in other post-war contexts.20 But 
several factors maintained its momentum in the 1920s, especially in New York 
City.21 One was the growing availability of automobiles—tempting objects to steal 
and a means to evade authorities. Another was the profits to be made through the 
illicit liquor trade.22 Newspaper editors complained that “automobile bandits” 
went on crime sprees, while states such as New York still allowed prisoners the 
means to reduce their sentences through “good time” and to apply for parole.23 
Many legal experts questioned the veracity of claims that crime was out of control 
19. Victoria Nourse, “Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and Harshness” (2004) 39:4 
Tulsa L Rev 925.
20. See e.g. Lawrence M Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History (New York: Basic 
Books, 1993) at 449-52.
21. In New York City the jump in homicides was greater after the First World War than after 
any other previous war. Eric Monkkonen, Murder in New York City (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001) at 18-19.
22. See e.g. Lisa McGirr, The War on Alcohol: Prohibition and the Rise of the American State (New 
York: WW Norton & Co, 2016).
23. “America’s Crime Wave,” New York Tribune (16 February 1919) 3.
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but headlines spoke louder, and a pervasive sense of fear clouded the mental 
world of 1920s New York.24
Crime was the Jazz Age’s seedy underbelly in post-war America, which 
novelist F. Scott Fitzgerald portrayed in The Great Gatsby (1925). The novel’s 
setting—Sands Point, Long Island—was the real-life location for a series of 
robberies that took place in the summer of 1921, when a gang of thieves made 
off with gold, coins, jewellery, and $40,000 in stock certificates, the property 
of Commodore Frank S. Hastings—yachtsman, ranchman, and financier.25 
Although police captured the bandits, who were subsequently convicted, this 
show of law enforcement failed to inspire Hastings’ confidence that justice would 
be served. One of the gunmen bragged after his conviction that he expected a 
“speedy release,” since he had sufficient “political influence” to secure parole. 
More brazenly, the “thug” vowed to return to Sands Point, to rob the rich 
residents and kill Hastings.26 Under the circumstances the law’s deterrent majesty 
was sorely wanting.
By the 1920s, leaders of government and industry felt pressured to take 
action against unwarranted discretionary justice. “Governor Sees Crime Wave 
Due to ‘Living Fast,’” was the New York Times’ headline for Republican Governor 
Nathan Miller’s January 1922 address to the state legislature on the problem. New 
York’s governors, elected directly by the people, delivered periodic messages to 
the legislature on matters of the moment, and their annual addresses commented 
on the general state of affairs, alerted politicians to policies under review, and 
highlighted matters they might act upon. Miller attempted to allay public anxiety 
over the audacity of criminals by stressing that he kept a tight rein on his use of 
clemency, unlike his immediate predecessor, Democrat Alfred E. Smith, who 
had “let a good many people out of prison” through his liberal use of the pardon 
power. Miller announced that he had granted just two pardons and commuted 
the sentences of twelve prisoners over the previous year. “I understand I have a 
reputation for being hard-hearted,” he conceded, but the governor’s prerogative 
must be “exercised very sparingly, with ‘very’ underscored … It is a power in 
which sentiment and sympathy should be very carefully controlled.”27 Only a 
24. When the Medico-Legal Society of New York met early in 1922, one member stated, “there 
is no crime wave,” but simply an increase in young men’s use of guns, “owing to the use 
of firearms in the army.” Alexander Karlin “For Suspended Sentences,” New York Times 
(12 January 1922) 4.
25. Donald L Miller, Supreme City: How Jazz Age Manhattan Gave Birth to Modern America 
(New York: Simon & Shuster, 2014).
26. “Miller Defends the Parole Board,” New York Times (15 January 1922) 16.
27. “Governor Sees Crime Wave Due to ‘Living Fast,’” New York Times (20 January 1922) 1.
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strong office holder could resist the urge to pardon out of sympathy, and the 
Times applauded Miller’s stingy record: “He has been very sparing, indeed some 
have called him niggardly.”28
Miller’s favourable headlines notwithstanding, he was keenly aware that 
public confidence in criminal justice was on the wane, especially in the minds of 
wealthy New Yorkers. Two weeks before the governor’s statement to the legislature 
Commodore Hastings had written Miller to express his “intense indignation” 
over the anticipated parole of the men who had robbed him. He had also hired 
a lawyer to present a formal protest against the paroling of dangerous criminals 
“on fake pretext and crocodile tears.” Although New York’s governors played no 
direct role in the state’s parole system or its related indeterminate sentencing laws, 
introduced in 1889, Hastings and his well-heeled neighbours demanded that the 
governor take action against the paroling of “arch fiends.”29 One such man was 
an African American former parolee named Luther Boddy, who had shot and 
killed two white detectives in New York City just days before Hastings wrote the 
governor.30 Yet the Commodore was less exercised over this “cop fighter” than he 
was over the white men who served on the Board of Parole:
We are in greater danger from that board than we are from the thugs themselves. We 
can kill the thugs, and are prepared to do so; but we seem to have no redress against 
the action of the Parole Board, which all agree is a menace to public safety.31
Threatened with elite vigilantism, Governor Miller publicly backed the 
board, but privately he put its chairman on notice.32 Thereafter repeat offenders 
and “life men” were to be paroled rarely, and he admonished the board to refer 
any such exceptional cases to the governor’s office.33 In the niggardly pardoner’s 
mind, executive clemency was more judicious than the opaque decisions of 
state bureaucrats.
In the 1922 State elections Alfred Smith made a comeback, riding on 
support for his calls to modify the federal restrictions on alcohol.34 His tenure 
28. Ibid.
29. Hastings to Miller, Papers of Governor Nathan L. Miller (11 January 1922; 15 January 1922), 
Albany NY, New York State Archives (box 14, file 150-586, 13682-78B) [Miller Papers].
30. “Negro Bandit Kills 2 Police Detectives,” New York Times (6 January 1922) 1. The officers 
had attempted to question Boddy on suspicion of robbery and murder.
31. Hastings to Miller, Miller Papers, supra note 29 (11 January 1922).
32. “Miller Defends Parole Board,” New York Times (15 January 1922) 1.
33. Miller to George W Benham, Miller Papers, supra 29 (January 17, 1922). Benham was the 
board’s Chairman and a fellow Republican.
34. Christopher M Finan, Alfred E. Smith: The Happy Warrior (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2002) at 171-72.
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this time would, however, be longer and far bumpier than Miller’s, since the 
state’s legislature remained Republican controlled over the 1920s. Most of the 
metropolitan dailies, led by the Brooklyn Eagle, amplified that party’s call for 
tougher laws with fewer loopholes for criminals to evade punishment. The 
Democratic governor’s use of his discretionary powers was closely watched 
and frequently condemned, but when it came to the Board of Parole’s actions 
Smith shared his opponents’ concerns that administrative discretion required an 
overhaul. Indeed, he went so far as to endorse the many academic criminologists 
and psychologists, who claimed that criminal sentencing ought to be a matter 
for experts, not judges or parole authorities. As Smith no doubt anticipated, 
the Republican majority rejected his proposal; instead, they rammed through a 
sheaf of regressive statutes in 1926, which left the governor’s power to pardon the 
felon’s only hope to leave prison alive.
IV. THE FAILINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
By the 1920s the Empire State operated the largest and most differentiated 
penal-correctional system in the United States. Historians such as David J. 
Rothman, Nicole Hahn Rafter and Rebecca McClennan have emphasised New 
York’s leadership in experimenting with new forms of prison management, 
such as Sing Sing warden Thomas Mott Osborne’s “Mutual Welfare League.”35 
Scholars have also emphasized the rising influence of experts, and their methods 
of classifying, treating, and releasing prisoners under the rubric of indeterminate 
sentencing.36 The Elmira Reformatory in upstate New York led the world in 
devising means to screen inmates for medical and moral ‘deviations’ and to 
monitor parolees after release. The search for ‘defectives’ and attempts to sift 
them out broadened and became more sophisticated over the 1910s, as New 
York introduced psychological clinics in the Bedford Hills Reformatory for 
Females and Sing Sing State Prison. Psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, 
and criminologists entered prisons, turning inmates into ‘cases’ requiring expert 
35. David J Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: the Asylum and its Alternatives in Progressive 
America (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1980); Nicole Hahn Rafter, Partial Justice: 
Women in State Prisons, 1800-1935 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1985); Rebecca 
M McLennan, The Crisis of Imprisonment Protest, Politics, and the Making of the American 
Penal State, 1776–1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
36. For an historic analysis of the rise, fall, and resurfacing of indeterminate sentencing, see Fiona 
Doherty, “Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release” (2013) 
8:3 NYUL Rev 958.
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judgement.37 Critical histories of Progressive penology have emphasized that 
punitive convenience consistently trumped the corrective consciences of the men 
and women whose authority rested on their training in social and behavioural 
science.38 Histories of parole in the United States share this dim view of Progressive 
penology: The supervision of parolees expanded the carceral state, leading to 
more intensive governance of poor and African American communities.39
These damning depictions of penal modernity’s class, race, and gender biases 
would have been unrecognizable to New Yorkers in the post-war era, whether 
friends or foes of Progressivism. This does not mean the state’s penal system 
lacked critics; rather, criticism was filtered through a different lens in the 1920s. 
Metropolitan newspapers sold by the tens of thousands by blaring that crime was 
skyrocketing. Far from net widening, it looked to most New Yorkers that the 
prison system needed to punish more criminals and incarcerate them longer.40 
City and state police authorities felt the heat of public demands for order, but 
parole authorities were scorched over their handling of administrative discretion. 
Even parole’s supporters, such as Brooklyn Mayor John F. Hylan, condemned 
New York’s system: “The beneficent purposes of the parole system … have been 
too frequently disfigured by a mushy sentimentality… [there have been] too 
many instances of criminals to whom mercy was injudiciously extended.” With 
friends like Hylan the discretionary release of prisoners needed no enemies, but 
they lined up in force by the mid 1920s. Every time a previously paroled inmate 
committed a violent crime bold headlines convinced New Yorkers that the “loose 
administration of the parole law” must come to an end.41
Criminal justice authorities, particularly academics and contributors to 
highbrow magazines, were sceptical of newspaper editors’ claims, but few believed 
that the ideals of screened and monitored release had been implemented.42 From 
its origins in the 1840s the Prison Association of New York (PANY) advocated 
37. These diagnostic terms, favoured by Progressives, were stigmatic. Rothman, supra 
note 35 at 328.
38. Supra note 35.
39. For the most influential work on this topic, see Simon, supra note 14. See also, A Keith 
Bottomley, “Parole in Transition: A Comparative Study of Origins, Developments and 
Prospects for the 1990s” (1990) 12 Crime & Just 319.
40. The term “net widening” refers to the expansion of social control that attends various forms 
of penal diversion. Thomas G Blomburg, “Foreword,” in Rothman, surpa note 35 at xii.
41. “Criminals and the Courts,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle (8 January 1922) 4B.
42. Raymond Moley, An Outline of the Cleveland Crime Survey (Cleveland: The Cleveland 
Foundation, 1922) at 57. Over one month in 1919, Moley (who held a PhD in political 
science from Columbia University) found that the amount of crime coverage in Cleveland 
had increased seven-fold, while the rate of crime had stayed steady.
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penal modernization, and it claimed credit for introducing parole to the state in 
the 1870s at Elmira. Initially, the organization considered the State’s selection 
criteria for Board of Parole appointments perfectly acceptable. A record of 
public service did nicely, as did the assumption that middle-aged white men of 
probity could be trusted to exercise “great discrimination and sound judgment.”43 
PANY applauded New York’s decision to hire physicians and psychiatrists to report 
on parole applicants’ suitability for release, detailing their physical and mental 
‘defects,’ but the organization found it worrying that the board’s decisions took 
little account of this expertise. In his 1921 Annual Report the Secretary of PANY 
praised New York’s embrace of “modern efforts in the solution of the treatment 
of crime and delinquency,” but he decried the amateurish administration of 
parole. If the board failed to modernize, public demand for harsher justice 
would continue to escalate. Nothing but an authoritative and judicious system 
of discretionary release would stifle the “loud clamor for a reversion to more 
punitive forms of treatment for law breakers.”44 These were prescient words. Over 
Governor Smith’s second and third term that clamour became deafening in the 
press and, more significantly, the legislature responded.
V. THE PRESSER AFFAIR AND THE PURSUIT OF PENAL 
CERTAINTY
If wealthy Long Islanders managed to turn their victimization into an attack 
on parole in the early 1920s, the Izzy Presser affair of 1926 nearly destroyed the 
concept of indeterminate punishment and the discretionary mechanisms that 
controlled it. Isadore “Izzy” Presser was the sort of criminal who gave believers 
in the crime wave reason to accuse the parole system of abetting criminality. 
Presser began his lawless life in his teens, and his use of firearms earned him the 
profile of a gun-toting gangster. In 1915 Presser and an associate gunned down 
another underworld figure before witnesses. Indicted for pre-meditated murder, 
he chose to plead guilty to manslaughter in the first degree, which earned him 
a sixteen-year sentence, reducible through “good time” credits.45 By 1926 the 
District Attorney’s earlier decision to accept a plea was not the discretionary act 
43. State of New York, Prison Department, Annual Report of the Superintendent of State Prisons for 
the Year Ending September 30, 1902 (February 1903) at 13.
44. Prison Association of New York, Annual Report of the Prison Association of New York, 1921 
(Albany, NY: JB Lyon, 1921) 23 at 24-25 [PANY, Report].
45. “Two Gangsters Plead Guilty to Murder and Get 12 Years Each,” New York Evening World 
(10 August 1915) 3.
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that incensed the public; rather, it was the Board of Parole’s decision to release 
Presser on parole. In April the public learned that the gunman, who had racked 
up numerous misconduct charges and escaped prison in 1921, was to be paroled 
into the custody of the Jewish Board of Guardians. New York’s Superintendent 
of Prisons, an ex officio member of the state board, had evidently dismissed the 
prisoner’s “black marks” and recommended that he be released on parole.46
The Brooklyn Eagle’s editor could not have wished for a better case. By law, 
Presser should have been tried for jail-breaking and required, at the very least, 
to serve out his full original sentence. Over the previous few years the paper had 
depicted parole as a system run by “sob sisters” posing as judicious men. Stronger 
words seemed appropriate in this case, which gave off the stench of corruption 
on top of incompetence. “VICIOUS CRIMINAL TO BE FREED,” the Eagle 
screeched, calling the Board’s decision “another flagrant illustration of the way in 
which notorious and vicious criminals are slipped out of State prisons through an 
abuse of the parole system.”47 Presser’s controversial parole provided compelling 
evidence that administrative discretion endangered public safety.
Parole’s embattled supporters had their own reasons to find the case troubling. 
There was no question that parole, whatever its failings, had become an essential 
cost-saving measure and the chief means to manage the burgeoning number of 
prisoners in the country’s largest penal system. Its repeal would spell more than 
a defeat for Progressive penological principles: it was a recipe for calamity in the 
already overburdened prison system. The fiasco prompted Governor Smith to take 
bold action against the board, by ordering it to rescind Presser’s parole pending 
an investigation into the case and the parole system’s operations at large.48 This 
showdown asserted executive discretion’s superiority over administrative justice, 
with Smith exhibiting the “just responsibility” the founding fathers had granted 
the president’s office. Taking a tough stand against the board also allowed the 
Democratic governor to claim a leadership position in the mounting war against 
crime. In the summer of 1925 industry leaders, including Elbert H. Gary, the 
chairman of the board of US Steel, had beaten Smith to the field of battle when 
46. “Long Unfit for his Office,” The Long Islander (30 April 1922) 1. The Board of Parole 
comprised the State Superintendent, acting with two governor-appointed members. US, 
An Act Constituting the State Prison Commission, a State Board of Parole, and Authorizing it to 
Parole the Prisoners in State Prisons; NY, Laws of the State of New York, NY, 1901, c 260.
47. “Vicious Criminal to be Freed Next Week on Parole,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle (23 April 1926) 1.
48. Governor Smith to James L Long (30 April 1926), in Alfred E Smith, Public Papers of Alfred 
E. Smith, Governor of New York, 1923–1928, vol 3 (Albany, NY: JB Lyon, 1938) at 514 
[Smith, Public Papers].
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they took command of what they termed a “citizen’s anti-crime crusade.”49 At that 
point, “big business” had invited the governor along to their initial meeting out 
of courtesy. Less than a year later the bungled parole of Izzy Presser put the chief 
executive back in charge, determined to revamp parole.
VI. QUESTIONING ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY
Since the early 1920s the parole problem had vexed men of property and lent 
support to Smith’s political rivals. In 1925 one Republican observer of New York’s 
criminal justice system summed up his party’s view: “the laws are too lax, the 
parole board is—well—rotten, and the judges are too lax in imposing sentences 
under the laws we now have.”50 Republican Senator Baumes added personal clout 
to this cause. In the guise of delivering a report on the state of civil and criminal 
law in March of 1926, he laid out his formula for root and branch reform. Based 
on his claim that violent crime in New York had doubled in the previous five 
years, Baumes demanded that scope for discretion be narrowed: “The present 
conditions demand firmness in all officials having to do with the administration 
of criminal law and that of executive pardons.”51 Although he saved his harshest 
remarks for the Board of Parole, Baumes also judged the current governor too 
soft: “leniency in any official heartens the criminal.”52 Thus, Smith’s reprimand 
of the board a month later and his appointment of a Commissioner were two 
counterpunches that followed the senator’s swipe. Penal politics were intensely 
personal in this policy ring, and both men were prepared to go the distance.
When commissioner George W. Alger delivered his report on parole late 
in 1926 he concluded that the system had failed to keep pace with up-to-date 
methods of case management.53 Over the course of his investigation, Alger 
uncovered evidence that three board members, travelling once per month on 
a circuit of the state’s prisons, had to process fifty to seventy-five applicants per 
day. The chairman, George Benham, admitted that board members did not use 
49. “Gary in Body to Fight Crime,” Pittsburgh Gazette Times (30 July 1925) 1.
50. “Clayton Indorses Gov. Smith’s Plan for a Crime Board,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle (2 August 2 
1925) 6A. Walter F Clayton sided with fellow Republicans, who urged the Board of Parole’s 
abolition, so that it could work “in favor of the average citizen instead of the criminal 
and law-breaker.”
51. Caleb Howard Baumes, New York (State) Legislature, Report of the Joint Legislative Committee 
on the Civil and Criminal Practice Acts (Albany, NY: JB Lyon Company, 1926).
52. Ibid.
53. Report of Commissioner on Board of Parole and Parole System (1926), in Smith, Public 
Papers, supra note 48 at 519-34 [Report of Commissioner].
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a points system to appraise prisoners’ eligibility; instead, they considered “the 
look” of them, and offered offenders what he termed “fatherly advice.”54 When 
it came to reports from prison physicians and psychiatrists, Benham stated 
(correctly) that they were not obliged to consider evidence of mental or physical 
defects. Alger found it extraordinary to hear that the board relied on the word 
of prisoners and their keepers, rather than examining each applicant’s ‘social 
history.’ When he questioned the official who had recommended Presser’s parole, 
Superintendent James L. Long, he received a similar response about the vague 
criteria for parole. Alger persisted: “So that when you really get down to the 
question of what the parole board has to judge a man by it is how he appears, 
plus what the shop [overseer] says about his conduct?”55 Long saw nothing wrong 
with this approach, since prisoners had the “right” to expect parole once they 
served their minimum sentences without violating prison rules. In his final report 
Alger condemned Long’s orientation toward prisoners’ rights: “It is not enough 
that the Parole Board should, as it says, ‘retain the respect and confidence of the 
prisoner.’”56 Because prisoners were typically paroled after serving their minimum 
sentences, Alger concluded that the board had lost “the respect and confidence 
of society itself.”57 A suspect system of discretionary justice, not just New York’s 
“arch criminals,” had eroded confidence in the law.58
Commissioner Alger did not advocate the abolition of parole or the cessation 
of pardoning, as some law and order advocates wished. His prognosis was that 
the Progressive programme of indeterminate sentencing, parole, and probation, 
introduced in the late nineteenth century, would ultimately prove its worth 
if parole were to become based on “facts,” which added up to a “reasonable 
probability” of an inmate’s likelihood of “remaining at liberty without violating 
the law.”59 Because New York had underfunded and undermanned the operation 
of the board these ideals had yet to be properly evaluated. To become more 
than a “moral gesture,” Alger advised, parole required the state’s investment in a 
full-time body of properly trained members, prepared to base their decisions on 
54. “Investigation of the Board of Parole and the Prison Department of the State of New York, 
stenographers minutes,” in Papers of Governor Alfred E. Smith, Albany NY, New York State 
Archives (Box 65, 13682-53A) at 327.
55. Ibid at 401.
56. Ibid.
57. “New Parole Body and Pardon Plan Urged by Alger,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle (10 December 
1926) 1. The Eagle published the Report of Alger’s Commission almost verbatim.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid at 2.
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expert assessments.60 Such a body of men could operate according to the latest 
social scientific case management protocol. This arrangement would also allow 
trained professionals to assist the governor in executing his authority to commute 
sentences. Although the question of executive discretion was beyond Alger’s 
brief, he used his report to highlight that the gubernatorial prerogative also sat 
awkwardly in the modern administrative state.61 Mercy must remain but it must 
also, somehow, be modernized alongside parole. Surprisingly, hardliners agreed.
VII. EXECUTIVE DISCRETION AS PENAL ANTIDOTE
Demands for tougher law enforcement registered at all levels of government 
by the mid-1920s. President Calvin Coolidge launched a federal Crime 
Commission in November 1925, as interstate crime increased under Prohibition, 
but New York’s Crime Commission, launched in May 1926, gained a higher 
national profile. Under Baumes’ leadership it oversaw the dramatic rollback 
of indeterminate sentencing, earned release schedules, and liberal parole 
provisions, which Progressive penologists had introduced over the previous 
four decades.62 The Commission became a sharp-toothed watchdog snapping 
at lapses in policing, punishment, and prosecution, but there was one branch of 
government it handled with care: executive discretion. Despite the Commission’s 
and Republicans’ regular harping over Smith’s liberal pardoning, the governor’s 
prerogative survived while judicial discretion was mauled.
Taking a tough stance on prisoners’ opportunities to shorten their 
sentences and clipping judges’ options to vary sentences according to individual 
circumstances did not translate into disapproval of clemency. Indeed, mandatory 
penalties heightened clemency’s symbolic significance. Liberal-minded critics 
and benevolent associations hoped that gubernatorial clemency would reduce 
unwarranted suffering. When PANY reported in 1927 that cases of “manifest 
injustice” had come to light it projected that “cases of that kind can be taken 
care of through executive clemency.”63 For different reasons Baumes resisted 
demands from within his own party to axe executive discretion. If handled 
60. Ibid at 1.
61. See Rachel E Barkow, “The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy” 
(2008) 121:5 Harv L Rev 1333.
62. The Commission’s official brief was to examine the “crime situation” in the state, as well as 
the “punishment treatment and pardon of convicted persons.” Mary M Stolberg, Fighting 
Organized Crime: Politics, Justice and the Legacy of Thomas E. Dewey (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1995) at 101-102.
63. PANY Report, supra note 44 at 25.
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with far greater restraint and discrimination the pardon power could operate 
without interfering with crime control. “In times like we are now experiencing,” 
he advised, a soft-hearted approach to discretionary justice must stop:
It is extremely easy through the relaxing of rigid scrutiny of the merits of individual 
applications for executive clemency and the giving of freer rein to sentimentalism, 
to so hearten the criminal classes as to create in them a feeling of security that an 
avenue of escape from the service of prison terms exists, no matter what the sentence 
of the court nor the enormity of the offense.64
According to Baumes, building a road to a greater sense of security among the 
law-abiding public required narrowing avenues for clemency and straightening 
out protocol concerning applications for mercy. As it was currently practiced 
executive clemency eroded the “majesty of the law,” but governors could shore 
it up by dispensing mercy in the manner of a formal and solemn “judicial 
proceeding.”65 Like Alexander Hamilton, Baumes regarded executive justice as a 
tool of statecraft in dangerous times. But times had changed since the Revolution. 
In the late 1920s the pardon power became the hard-liners’ antidote for possible 
side effects of mandatory sentencing.
VIII. HARD CASES, MERCILESS TIMES
When gunman “Bum” Rogers was sent away for life in November 1926 as a 
repeat felony offender his sentence proved that mandatory sentencing was the 
bitter pill needed to cure the ills produced by New York’s parole system. “Turning 
the Criminals Loose,” an article that appeared in a social affairs magazine, 
connected Rogers’ case to Presser’s to dramatize the “debauch of leniency” that 
had infested New York’s penal system.66 It revealed that Smith, during his first 
term as governor, had commuted Rogers’ fourteen-year sentence for assault after 
he had served only two years. While on parole Rogers had committed numerous 
armed robberies, one of which netted him a thirty-year sentence. Like Presser, 
Rogers had managed to escape, but his recapture in 1927 allowed prosecutors to 
try him under the new fourth offender laws, which the Appellate Division of the 
New York Supreme Court had ruled constitutional in February 1927. The judge 
who presided over Rogers’ trial sang from Baumes’ song sheet as he delivered the 
64. “Executive Clemency,” in Baumes, Report of the Joint Legislative Committee, 
supra note 51 at 27.
65. Ibid.
66. Lawrence Veiller, “Turning the Criminals Loose,” The World’s Work (5 March 
1927) 546 at 549.
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sentence: “You have scorned society and as a spokesman for an aggrieved public 
it is my duty to give you the punishment which your conduct deserves.”67
The turn toward unflinching severity attracted plenty of adherents, including 
legislators in other states, but within New York opposition soon emerged. At the 
November 1927 meeting of the New York State Conference on Social Work, 
the head of the new Board of Parole, Dr. Kieb, denounced the mandatory 
sentencing statutes’ impact on the prison population, inflating numbers to 
dangerous levels. Democratic Assemblymen began to draft bills to restrict the 
laws to violent offenders. Philanthropists and businessmen concerned about 
de-investment in penal reform lobbied for the repeal of the laws.68 And quietly, 
District Attorneys encouraged repeat offenders to plead guilty to misdemeanors, 
while judges urged juries to consider convicting sympathetic offenders on lesser 
charges. The cultured Century Magazine, one of many elite organs opposed to the 
Baumes laws, observed that “not a few of our judges and prosecutors, as well as 
penologists, have found occasion to bitterly denounce them.”69
It took an ideal case, a change of governor, and growing anxiety over the 
ballooning state prison population and its attendant financial burden for the 
exercise of clemency to correct an injustice imposed through mandatory life 
sentencing. In 1928 Governor Smith gambled on a bid for the presidency and 
lost, leaving his younger protégé, Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt, to search for 
the means to increase the legitimacy of parole in a climate hostile to ‘breaks’ for 
criminals. Like his predecessor the new governor faced a Republican majority, 
and Roosevelt knew that any move to loosen the binds of mandatory sentencing 
would undermine his credibility as a crime fighter.  Since Roosevelt was powerless 
to change the law he cautiously administered the one corrective remedy Baumes 
had left on the shelf—executive clemency. As protest and unrest reached a fevered 
pitch in the state’s prisons the mitigation of Bart Garstin’s punishment pitted the 
legitimacy of the Baumes’ laws against the prerogative of mercy.
67. “Sing Sing Doors Lock in Rogers for the Rest of Life,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle 
(7 December 1926) 1 at 2.
68. Doctor Kieb spoke at the New York State Conference on Social Work, held in Troy, New 
York, 15-17 November 1927. On 1 February 1927 Assemblyman Jerome G Ambro 
introduced a bill to impose life sentences only when fourth-time offenders used a gun in 
two of four offences. Adolph Lewisohn, the wealthy industrialist who had headed the 1919 
Prison Survey Commission, wrote the Eagle’s editor to argue the need to consider individual 
cases and to allow for case reviews. See, Adolph Lewisohn, “Too Many Prisoners,” Brooklyn 
Daily Eagle (1 December 1927) A5.
69. Julius Hallheimer, “Justice by Formula: Who is an Habitual Criminal and What is a Felony,” 
Century Magazine 17:2 (December 1928) 232 at 233.
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IX. A DOSE OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
Garstin, a knock-about journalist, was no Bum Rogers, and his history of 
offending included no acts of violence. In the argot of the day he was a serial 
paper hanger, who had passed fraudulent cheques over a period of twenty-one 
years. In his 1927 trial the number that mattered was four: his fourth conviction 
for attempting to cash a worthless cheque in the amount of three hundred dollars, 
which led to his imprisonment for life. Nine months into office as governor, 
Roosevelt commuted that sentence and ordered Garstin’s release after he had 
served only two years and four months in prison. “BAUMES LAW UNJUST 
IN SEVERITY, ROOSEVELT HOLDS,” announced the first challenge the 
statutes faced.70 The governor took care to explain his decision, emphasizing that 
New York’s mandatory penalties had served a “salutary deterrent against crime.”71 
Unfortunately, these laws also carried the risk of “grave injustice,” as Garstin’s 
case illustrated.72 The District Attorney of New York County and the sentencing 
judge had both agreed that the man’s crimes did not warrant a life sentence, and 
their support allowed Roosevelt to leverage Garstin’s commutation into a plea 
for the Republican-dominated legislature to modify the law. In the meantime, 
gubernatorial mercy would rectify the injustice done to this one prisoner: “the 
only way in which this man can be spared from spending his whole life in prison 
… is by executive action.”73
Rather than denounce the governor’s commutation the Crime Commission 
reframed it as proof that strict laws, with the prospect of clemency, were just. 
The Commission’s Republican Vice-Chairman reminded New Yorkers that no 
law could apply in every case. Assemblyman Burton D. Esmond declared this 
was precisely why his party had criticized the liberality of parole while they 
ensured that executive discretion remained available in exceptional cases. The 
Republicans were not, however, prepared to modify the Baumes laws, and they 
tried to turn Roosevelt’s commutation against him: “the Governor, in exercising 
executive clemency, had made use of the very means provided for the purpose 
of preventing the working of an injustice.”74 The hardline critic had evidence to 
70. “Baumes Law Unjust in Severity, Roosevelt Holds,” Albany Times Union (23 
September 1929) 3.
71. State of New York, Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt Governor, Volume 1, 1929 (Albany, 
NY: J.B. Lyon, 1930) at 470.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid at 468-70.
74. “Governor Wrong on Baumes Law, Is Esmond Claim,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle 
(23 September 1929) 1.
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back his claim. By 1929, one hundred and sixty repeat felons had been sentenced 
to life before Roosevelt acted in the case of Garstin. “Does the Governor know 
of another case in which an injustice has been worked?”75 Esmond’s taunt was 
justified. Smith and Roosevelt were more concerned about their political fortunes 
than the suffering of minor criminals whose cases failed to fit the profile of a 
solid test case.
Despite executive inaction in scores of other cases involving sentences 
disproportionate to the gravity of prisoners’ offences, the penal landscape did 
shift in the direction Roosevelt favoured, tilting support away from sentencing 
rigidity. The punitive treatment of non-violent property offenders was just one 
problem that critics raised. Another was the fact that most offenders found guilty 
of violent first, second, or third offences paid a lower price than minor felony 
offenders who were found guilty of a fourth offence. The first woman sentenced 
under the Baumes laws was Ruth St. Clair, a young woman whose past crimes of 
shoplifting led to her life sentence in 1930 for stealing two coats. Immediately 
on sentencing her, General Sessions Judge Max Levine declared he would 
strongly support a bid for clemency.76 One newspaper highlighted the travesty 
of St. Clair’s sentence by contrasting it to the lighter punishment murderer Earl 
Pecox received for strangling his wife and burning her body. Convicted of murder 
in the second degree late in 1929, Pecox received a twenty-year sentence with 
the prospect of parole if he followed prison regulations.77 Justice was wildly out 
of kilter when anomalies of this nature surfaced, but how to restore a balance of 
sound penal policy?
Over 1929 the need to address this question became critical as the state’s 
prisons erupted in violence. Filled far beyond their capacity with a growing 
number of lifers, Clinton and Auburn State Prison were rocked by three violent 
outbreaks of prisoner protest. Just as liberal critics of mandatory sentencing had 
projected, Baumes had set a time bomb when he left men deprived of earning 
release no reason to obey rules and every inducement to use whatever means 
75. Ibid at 3.
76. “Seek Clemency for Woman Lifer,” Shamokin News-Dispatch (13 February 1930) 7. St Clair 
was convicted of grand larceny on 7 February 1930. In subsequent weeks the prosecutor in 
the case and the Chief Magistrate added their support.
77. “The Wonders of the Law,” Brookfield Courier (18 December 1923) 6. Pecox was convicted 
on 21 September 1929 of murder in the second degree in White Plains, New York. The 
offence carried a sentence of twenty years to life.
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possible to protest.78 Some repeat offenders were fortunate to be spared from 
joining lifers in the state prisons thanks to judges and prosecutors who induced 
accused offenders to plead to misdemeanors, and to jurors who refused to 
convict on felony charges, but such actions corroded confidence in the law. And 
gubernatorial clemency, even liberally applied, could not defuse the likelihood 
of future unrest. Added to this mix was the rising cost of imprisonment, which 
strained the state budget to the breaking point after the economic crash late in 
1929. An ever-growing population of felons with no prospect of parole and little 
chance of a pardon became unsustainable.
Amidst this crisis Roosevelt’s hard-nosed commitment to reassert executive 
power and to restore public confidence in parole led to a remarkable showdown 
between the governor and his Republican foes. In 1927, when the Court of 
Appeals upheld the mandatory sentencing laws, it had left a door ajar for their 
future modification. Any “feeling that the punishment was too severe for the 
nature and circumstances of the crime,” the Court had ruled, could be dealt 
with by the executive or legislature.79 This is precisely what happened. Four years 
after he crafted the landmark legislation that bore his name, Baumes eyed this 
altered penal and fiscal field and buckled. In 1930 the senator agreed to a plan 
Roosevelt devised to install a more professionally managed parole agency and 
to reintroduce sentencing options for repeat offenders.80 The executive, working 
with the legislature’s chief power broker, enhanced modern administrative 
discretion, recuperated judicial discretion, and preserved the governor’s 
prerogative to pardon.
X. CONCLUSION
The battle over discretionary justice in New York’s post-war decade could 
be read as a tussle between political titans with opposing crime fighting 
approaches. Because Roosevelt ultimately gained the upper hand presidential 
historians have identified his outmaneuvering of Baumes and his Republican 
majority as an early index of his penchant for a strong executive, supported by 
78. “Baumes Law Modification Advocated,” Albany Times Union (14 February 1930) 2. This 
story reported a speech by George M Alger before the Bar Association of New York, 
13 February 1930.
79. People v Gowasky, [1927] 244 NY 451 at 466, 155 NE 737.
80. “Baumes Planning to take Sting out of Life Term Law,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle 
(13 April 1930) 1.
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hand-picked experts, as the best means to steer public policy.81 Although this 
interpretation is persuasive it focuses narrowly on US politics in the period 
leading up to the Depression. The retreat from mandatory sentencing, viewed 
through a wider lens, exposes enduring struggles between three branches of state 
government. However, the settlement of 1930, which saw the establishment of a 
professionally staffed Parole Division working within the Executive Department, 
lends broader relevance to this episode in the history of discretionary justice. 
The professionalization of parole did not displace the pardon, as most penal 
histories claim or infer. Notwithstanding the growth of administrative discretion 
in modern penal politics executive power persisted, most dramatically in respect 
of death sentences. No one knew this better than the capitally convicted, and the 
men who continued to exercise the power of life and death. One of the last men 
to hold executive office while capital punishment remained in force, Governor 
W. Averell Harriman, revealed in 1958 what it felt like to exercise a prerogative 
tied to the divine right of kings: “Mercy is a lonely business.”82
The chief executive’s resilient pardoning power, despite a pervasive fear of 
crime and the full-bore attack on discretionary justice in the 1920s, is a reminder 
that evolving political and social currents lend historic penal practices new 
meanings. Hay demonstrated how scholars could interrogate those historic values 
when he asked why a system of pardoning endured for so long, in the face of 
Enlightenment thinkers’ reasoned arguments that terror, counterbalanced with 
frequent but uncertain mercy, provided an ineffective deterrent against crime.83 
The attempt to tame mercy and disputes over its proper place in criminal justice 
occurred not just in the Hanoverian period or under monarchical governance: 
it also took place in republics, and as late as the 1920s. The recursive character of 
swings between certainty and discretion in the delivery of criminal justice is less 
surprising, perhaps, than the continuing relevance of individual protagonists in 
these struggles. Whenever we take note of the king and his advisors, or an elected 
governor and his legislative rivals, we acknowledge that some history-making 
men (and only more recently women) have championed discretion while others 
have held out against it. Taking positions in penal politics can bring fame or 
infamy to political actors; in contrast, the Garstins and St. Clairs of the past 
81. See e.g. William E Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1963); Roger Daniels, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Road to the New Deal, 
1882-1939 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2015).
82. Averell Harriman & Murray Teigh Bloom, “Mercy is a Lonely Business,” Saturday Evening 
Post 230:38 (22 March 1958) 24. Harriman was governor between 1951 to 1955.
83. Hay, “Property,” supra note 7.
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are known to us only because their cases for clemency suited the purposes of 
power-wielders.
In an early appraisal of Albion’s Fatal Tree, the collection in which Hay’s essay 
originally appeared, a reviewer alerted students of contemporary “American law 
and criminology” to the work’s “theoretical and methodological implications.”84 
For forty years, socio-legal scholars have followed that recommendation by 
applying Hay’s understanding of mercy to contemporary penal problems. 
In contrast, historians of criminal justice in the United States have all but 
ignored it. There is ample evidence that discretionary justice troubled New 
Yorkers during the Prohibition period as deeply as it did Blackstone, Beccaria, 
or, indeed, Alexander Hamilton in the late eighteenth century. The terms of 
discussion were different in the 1920s but the historic question remained the 
same: how to uphold the ideology of the rule of law against the myriad grounds, 
just and unjust, on which exceptions might be made? Modernity has proved no 
match for discretionary justice; whether personal or administrative, it never fails 
to penetrate penal justice, despite the earnest drive to certainty and the persistent 
demands to terrorize criminals. Yet the directions in which it flows, and the depth 
of its penetration, can never correct the systemic inequities of criminal justice.
84. Gerda Ray, Book Review of Albion’s Fatal Tree, Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century 
England, by Douglas Hay et al, eds, and Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act, 
by EP Thompson (1976) 6 Crime & Soc Just 86 at 87.
